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I.

INTRODUCTION

Tonight I want to talk about the dynamics of economic
integration in the Western Hemisphere, especially the challenges

that face the United States if integration is to succeed. It is a
challenge to our capacity for leadership, a challenge to our policy
wisdom, to our sense of justice, even to our morality and most
certainly a challenge to our staying power. The topic is, of
course, close to home. For the next two years Miami will be the
locale for the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA). For any young lawyer intent upon pursuing
the potential that lies in Miami's increasing focus on South and
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Central America and the Caribbean, the subject is a matter of
vital interest.
The crafting of elaborate plans for integrating either the
whole of the continent or some sub-region thereof has, since
World War II, been a favorite pastime of many Latin American
political leaders. The more ambitious attempts dating from the
early 1960s include: the Latin American Free Trade Agreement,
1960, replaced in 1980 by the Latin American Integration
Association; the Central American Common Market, 1960; the
Caribbean Free Trade Association, 1965, replaced in 1973 by the
Caribbean Common Market; and the Andean Pact, 1969. The
most recent movements are, of course, Mercosur or Mercosul and
a series of bi and trilateral arrangements of lesser scope.
Leaving aside, for the moment, Mercosur and the other more
recent efforts-they exist in a different context-the record of the
earlier more ambitious plans is a very disappointing story. A few
did foster some economic growth in their early stages. None,
however, at any time, succeeded in making the intra-regional
market-trade between Members-the dominant export market
for any of their members. They were just incapable of mustering
the industrial synergies (economies of scale, technological and
managerial skills, competitive ethos in the context of law) that
were essential if economic integration was to yield any
advantages whatsoever.
In contrast to what was transpiring in South and Central
America during the same period, the United States and
Canada-the only fully developed countries of the Western
Hemisphere-stood haughtily aloof from all involvement in
hemispheric integration, except as some coordination of economic
policies took place under the Alliance for Progress, the
Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, the International Monetary Fund conditionality, and
ultimately the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Now, why do I think anything will change? Why will the
disappointments of the past in South and Central America and in
the Caribbean not just repeat themselves? With opposition to
free trade and to the further globalization of production
appearing so often in the ascendancy in Canada and the United
States, why will these two countries simply not stall on accepting
the full implications of integration. Why will they not be
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satisfied to lend only such lip service to the FTAA process, as is
necessary for the Clinton Administration to save face?
Remember Clinton started it all in Miami in 1994. Why is
anything different now?
The entire
The answer: conditions are very different.
political and economic context has changed. And while nothing is
certain-failure always lies within the ready grasp of
statesmen-there are strong reasons to hope that they will either
have the wisdom, or be forced by circumstances, to forego the
easy road to failure and achieve a genuine success.
II. CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
What are these changes? First, starting with the late 1980s
and continuing with a rush into the 1990s, fundamental reforms
have started to take place in the economic outlook and policy
orientation of nearly all the countries of South and Central
America and the Caribbean. Much of the stimulus for change
came from the disappointments of the 1980s-the "lost decade."
The numbers tell a tale of sharply lower, even declining, rates of
growth. By the end of that decade, most observers had come to
realize that the inward-looking import substitution policies
forged in the 1950s and 1960s had run their course. Cut off from
the technological advances enjoyed by the rest of the free world,
and saddled with cumbersome public enterprises wielding
monopoly power, the inward-looking policies had rapidly trapped
Latin America in a pattern of ever increasing waste and
inefficiency that eroded their resource base, spawned wholesale
macroeconomic instability, and left them powerless to grasp the
advantages integration might otherwise have offered.
As a consequence, all the countries of the region have now
begun to replace the inward-looking import substitution policies
with full participation in the multilateral World Trade
Organization (WTO) trading system, privatization of State
enterprises, greater reliance on market forces to allocate
resources, retrenchment in the size and intrusiveness of the
bureaucracy, the elimination of much regulatory hostility toward
foreign investment, and the beginnings of true legal reform.
Although in many countries these changes have only just begun,
in most the critical turn seems to have been accomplished.
Hopefully that progress will continue despite the threat of fiscal

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

inconstancy, monetary collapse and the looming accidents of
Asia. For the hard fact is that progress, any progress, ultimately
depends on whether the hopes and expectations that fueled the
change in the first place can be fulfilled. And the best hope for
fulfillment lies with the FTAA.
Second, for the United States and Canada the traditional
policy of standing aloof from all movement toward hemispheric
integration has become far too costly. Among this nation's most
pressing problems is the widespread stagnation of wages,
incomes and standards of living even as corporate earnings soar.
Faced with this over-hanging structural weakness, the United
States can ill afford to pass up the prospect of improved access to
a market of 350 million people (excluding Mexico). Today, in
industry after industry, export jobs pay fifteen percent more than
the average industry wage. Worker productivity at exporting
firms is twenty to forty percent higher, the employment
expansion rate twenty percent faster, and firm failures ten
percent less than at non-exporting firms. Small and medium
sized exporters do better on these indicia than their large
multinational cousins and account for seventy percent of all
foreign sales.
Even as experience seems to confirm predictions that
NAFTA would not immediately yield any significant net increase
in jobs, there is increasing evidence that export growth can yield
highly favorable changes in the composition of the job market.
When one then adds the market for services, opportunities for
high return capital investments and the prospects for improved
American competitiveness through enhanced globalization of
production, it is utterly beyond doubt that the United States has
a major stake in the successful establishment of a hemispheric
free trade area.
Third, reform within South and Central America and the
Caribbean and the new incentives for the United States and
Canada to join the integration movement combine to yield yet a
further reason why current efforts are taking place within a
broader economic context, utterly different from that which
surrounded prior failed efforts. For South and Central America
and the Caribbean, integration will mean improved access to
badly needed capital, technology and, perhaps more importantly
(if the NAFTA model is at all influential), access to traditionally
protected areas of what is the world largest and wealthiest
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market (the U.S-Canadian market) especially in textile, garment,
agricultural, and selected industrial products. This, in turn,
could assist some Latin American economies to attain a needed
measure of diversification and could unleash, for certain
industries, dynamic forces too long suppressed by the limited size
of their own domestic markets and their lack of modern
technology. In a very real sense, this is the carrot to pay for the
painful reforms through which Latin America must pass before it
can take full advantage of the gains that integration offers-a
carrot that was never there in the past.
III. THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
Now, against this background let me turn to the challenges
that the project poses for the United States. Realistically, the
enterprise cannot succeed unless the United States takes a
leadership role. I say this while fully aware of the fact that U.S.
leadership can too often breed outpourings of Latin resentment.
How to deal with this problem I leave to others, except to note
that American diplomacy has to be very skilled.
What then does leadership mean? First, early on, the carrot
has to be put clearly on the table. Doing so is a symbolic matter
necessary to persuade the rest of the hemisphere to offer equally
tangible benefits to the United States and to each other under
Most Favored Nation-a signal that integration is to be a real,
truly meaningful change in our day to day economic
relationships, not just a cosmetic for political consumption.
Admittedly, this will be tough to accomplish, especially where
Florida's interests are concerned. Despite the gains which the
State as a whole is likely to realize from the FTAA, the politics of
trade in the State still seem to be in the control of certain
Mounting a
historically entrenched protectionist forces.
challenge to those forces would appear a worthy project for the
Florida bar.
Second, a far more subtle matter calling for a great deal of
diplomatic finesse, the United States must make sure that the
text of the FTAA, and the institutions established to police that
text, are much more than just the trappings of a free trade
agreement. The text must be a charter of fundamental domestic
economic reform along neo-liberal, or more accurately, modem
capitalistic lines. It must guaranty the rights of foreign investors
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and require modern intellectual property laws. It must include
ways to constrain fiscal profligacy. Competition policy must be
exact and exacting. Worker rights-subject always to market
discipline-must be spelled out.
A mechanism must be
established to deal with the subtle trade offs between the
environment and trade and adjudicate disputes expeditiously
and competently. NAFTA, of course, provides examples of the
many features that the FTAA should contain, although NAFTA
should not be treated as a model for the FTAA. If anything, the
FTAA should go beyond NAFTA or the WTO Agreements.
The important point here, however, is to understand the
dynamics of such an agreement. As already noted, many, if not
most, of the countries in South and Central America and the
Caribbean have already embarked on the reforms I suggest ought
to be enshrined in the FTAA text. So why is their embodiment in
the treaty so important? Putting the reforms into the text of a
multilateral agreement will obviously tend to harmonize national
efforts.
That itself is likely to be worthwhile, especially if
accompanied by a single authoritative interpreter of the text.
But far more important is the fact that dissident political forces
opposed to any of the reforms will invariably find it far more
difficult to overturn reforms embodied in domestic legislation if,
to do so, would also constitute breach of a solemn international
obligation of their country.
This is especially true if the
obligation is owed a major power such as the United States,
provided that power is prepared to take the lead in securing full
and vigorous enforcement of the treaty provisions.
Third, apart from our concern for domestic economic reform
there is another problem of massive proportions which if
unattended will render free trade within the hemisphere as
visionary as it ever was and the welfare gains from free trade as
illusive as in the failed efforts of the past. While the States
affected by it must bear the brunt of solving this problem, the
willingness to patiently insist upon solutions and to furnish
incentives for putting those solutions into effect is everywhere a
challenge to American leadership.
In no other continent do the majority of nations exhibit such
large disparities of income between rich and poor as in the case of
South and Central America. In few other continents are so large
a proportion of the people excluded from effective participation in
civil society. All this is in spite of the increase in democratically
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elected governments. In few other areas of the world are the
traditions of oligharic, often familial, control of economic life so
ingrained and resolute. In other words, country after country in
this hemisphere face a real and pressing problem of social justice.
To follow some of the more doctrinaire neo-liberal reformers and
ignore this problem is, as the history shows, an open invitation to
a political instability that must ultimately defeat the very
reforms that the neo-liberal theorists so confidently espouse.
Yet, to abandon or even compromise the reforms to an overriding
preoccupation with social justice-to yield to the intellectual
left-is no less self-defeating. Both ideological extremes threaten
to destroy the very welfare gains they claim as the object of their
policy prescriptions.
Here then is the greatest challenge to American leadership.
The task has many facets. And in many cases U.S. assistance
(both technical and financial) and U.S. insistence is likely to
provide the margin between success and failure. Inflation must
be kept under control. The poor are always the principal victims
of run away inflation. The rich are hardly bothered, and price
stability can often times match any welfare payments a
hundredfold. Competition policy must become a central element
in governmental regulation of the economy. The elimination of
wasteful monopolies, the lowering of costs to consumers and the
drive to more and better jobs through enhanced efficiency are the
essentials of social justice. Equally important are carefully
crafted labor laws which allow for the collective expression by
workers of their legitimate grievances without destroying the
competitive capability of the very institutions upon which their
jobs depend; a reasonably progressive income tax, effectively and
fairly collected, combined with a willingness to put the taxing
power to the proof of its needs; a banking and insurance system
strong enough, through competent regulation, to underwrite a
modern mass housing market; and effective health and product
safety legislation that fairly balances the users need for
protection against the producers need to stay in business. That,
and more, is all about social justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Put broadly, at the heart of the FTAA enterprise must lie an
effort to craft new and quite unprecedented institutional
arrangements that will guard against reversion to the older
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traditions of governance and to the recurring cycles in economic
outlook that are the tragic hallmark of Latin American history.
Through the internationalization of domestic economic policies
lies the prospect of someday seeing how efficiency can be
mobilized to help solve the over-arching problem of social justice,
and recognizing how destructive is the ideological mindset that
would treat allocative and distributive values as opposing forces
in some cosmological tug-of-war rather than as complementary
underpinnings to a new and more hopeful conception of the
State.

